

Record

OCA 86-2885
22 August 1986

NOTE FOR: John Helgerson

FROM:

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SUBJECT: Possible SSCI Hearing

We have received indications that the SSCI is likely to invite us to testify on how we plan to conduct the analysis requested in the attached letter. No date has been suggested, but I expect the Committee would want to hear from us before the Senate adjourns at the beginning of October.

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Attachment
as stated

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July 23, 1986

Executive Registry
65- 3370X

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

Last June, the Reagan Administration announced that, henceforth, U.S. strategic deployments would be decided on the basis of U.S. security needs, without regard as to whether these deployments exceeded the limits of the 1979 SALT II agreement.

This summer and autumn, the Senate may vote on whether to restrict the obligation of funds for certain U.S. forces which, if deployed, would exceed some of the sub-limits of the SALT II agreement. It may also vote on whether to urge the President to continue complying with SALT II. Additional Senate actions may be considered in the course of the defense and intelligence review for FY 1988.

Similarly, arms control talks between the Soviet Union and the United States are likely to continue in the areas of strategic, intermediate, nuclear, space-based, and defensive weapons. The prospects for these negotiations are uncertain, and will probably remain uncertain even when the Senate will have to decide next year how much money to spend on defense, what programs to maintain, and how to develop its position on arms control.

The Soviet Union has a range of options it could pursue in response to this decision by the President and the potential actions on strategic issues by Congress. The Members of the Senate require an intelligence analysis that will enable them to judge how the Soviet Union is most likely to respond.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in fulfillment of its responsibility under S.Res. 400 to ensure that U.S. officials in both the Executive and Legislative branches are provided with the intelligence they require, requests the Intelligence Community to provide the Senate with such an analysis. This request has been coordinated with and is endorsed by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, who have participated in its drafting.

The analysis furnished the Senate should identify the range of responses that could be expected by the Soviets in such areas as:

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- o Strategic, intermediate range, and general purpose force deployments;
- o Military research and development;
- o Capital investment and material incentives for economic growth;
- o Participation in arms control and other diplomatic discussions;
- o Politico-military initiatives and military operations abroad;
- o Relations with Warsaw Pact and Western European countries; and
- o Any other area determined to be significant.


The analysis should identify the constraints that limit Soviet responses and potential compromises or tradeoffs they could make among competing priorities to respond to U.S. decisions in an optimal way.

It should also describe the political factors that would lead the Soviets to adopt one set of policies over another, given the constraints identified in the preceeding section. There will be a range of uncertainty in these options. The analysis should point out what the principle uncertainties are and how/what is necessary to close these gaps. Both of these sections should contain, and explain fully, contending views within the Intelligence Community.

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This analysis should be made available to the Congress by
February 1, 1987.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dave Burenberger", is written over the word "Sincerely," and the name "Dave Burenberger". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "D".

Dave Burenberger
Chairman

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Patrick Leahy", is written over the name "Patrick Leahy". The signature is smaller and more compact than the one above.

Patrick Leahy
Vice Chairman